Two opportunities to deliver on the Doha Development pledge: by Bouet, Antoine et al.
In this brief, we evaluate the effects of a possible Doha
agreement based on proposals currently on the table from the
United States, the European Union, and the Group of Twenty
(G20). We first begin with a basic scenario that represents a
compromise between the more and less ambitious aspects of these
proposals.1 As assessed in the MIRAGE general equilibrium model
of the world economy, this basic scenario yields a global income
gain of $54.7 billion, or about one-fourth of the global income
gains that are estimated from full trade liberalization.2 Gains are
distributed among countries in a slightly progressive manner but
are largely proportional to initial income shares, so the LDCs gain
only a paltry $1.0 billion.
We next consider two specific development-oriented modifica-
tions to the basic scenario. These modified scenarios demonstrate
that more can be done to benefit poor countries. In the first
alternative scenario, free access of LDCs to wealthy-country
OECD markets is increased from 97 percent to 100 percent, as
proposed by the European Union. This raises world income by
an additional $14.3 billion. Nearly half of these additional gains
go to the LDCs, and the increase of their income rises dramati-
cally, to $7.0 billion.
In the second scenario, the number of sensitive and special
products exempted from the agricultural tariff formula in the basic
scenario is reduced from 5 percent of tariff lines to 1 percent, as
proposed by the United States. This raises world income an addi-
tional $7.3 billion compared to the basic scenario. The additional
gains are distributed widely among countries, and are beneficial
among heterogeneous developing countries especially to those
where agriculture is an important source of employment and
export earnings. Though this scenario has the advantage of
providing a multilateral, nonpreferential improvement to the basic
scenario, gains are limited because the tariff cuts applied to nonsen-
sitive agricultural products in the basic scenario are not very
ambitious.
A Realistic Doha Scenario
To examine the potential consequences of a Doha agreement on
developing countries, and the possible opportunities for strength-
ening its development accomplishments, we first design a basic
scenario using numbers on the negotiating table (see Box 1). This
trade reform was based on discussions with negotiators and other
experts, and on our previous analysis of alternative levels of
ambition of the Doha outcome.
For agricultural tariff reform, the basic scenario includes a
compromise incorporating relatively ambitious threshold levels for
tiered cuts (larger cuts for higher initial tariffs), as proposed by the
G20, but with relatively unambitious reductions within each tier, as
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A
s of June 2006, a final agreement has eluded the parties to the Doha Development
Round trade negotiations. There was little finality to the December 2005 Hong Kong
Ministerial conference negotiations, even though members agreed to eliminate agricultural
export subsidies by 2013 and grant least developed countries (LDCs) free access to
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) markets for at least
97 percent of agricultural and manufacturing tariff lines by 2008. Though observers hoped
an agreement on negotiation modalities would be reached by the end of April 2006, a new




1 In the first brief in this Doha assessment series, we compared the net effects (in aggregate and among diverse developing countries) of an ambitious
cooperative reform outcome versus one drawn from the least ambitious elements of proposals on the table. See More or Less Ambition? Modeling the
Development Impact of U.S.-EU Agricultural Proposals in the Doha Round, December 2005. The ambitious outcome yielded average tariff reductions,
increased world trade and global welfare gains more than double those from the unambitious outcome.
2 The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) in Paris. A full description of the
model is available at the CEPII web site (www.cepii.fr). A synopsis is provided in IFPRI’s December 2005 assessment brief.
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www.ifpri.orgproposed by the EU. Tariff reductions are one-third less for middle-
income countries (MICs), and caps are imposed on agricultural
tariffs. The tariff reform is implemented at the level of disaggrega-
tion of the MacMap database (HS6 for products, with 148
reporting countries and 238 trade partners taken into account).3
For specific tariffs, the formula negotiated in Geneva in 2005 for
selecting reduction coefficients has been applied.4
Sensitive products (for developed countries) and special
products (for MICs) are exempt from the agricultural tariff-
reduction formula. These exemptions apply to 5 percent of agricul-
tural tariff lines (33 lines) in the basic scenario. Only half of the
tariff reduction under the tariff formula is applied to sensitive and
special products, and they are not subject to tariff caps. However,
to ensure minimal trade opening, the tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for
these products are expanded based on a formula proposed by the
EU. Selection of sensitive and special products is based on a calcu-
lation using both tariff levels and quantities of imports in order to
reflect the political economy of protective trade policy.5 For
example, sugar and rice are selected as sensitive products for the
United States, the European Union, and Japan. The United States
includes cheese and processed fruits and vegetables among its other
products; Japan includes meats, dairy products and beans; and the
European Union includes meats and cheeses, as well as bananas.
For manufactured goods, a Swiss formula is applied. The coef-
ficient is 10 percent for developed countries. In recent discussions
and forums, a 25 percent coefficient appeared plausible for MICs.
Such a level does not significantly change protection in countries
like Brazil and Argentina, but a 25 percent coefficient would
decrease industrial protection in numerous countries such as India,
Nigeria, and Morocco.
To determine products exempted by OECD countries from
free access for LDCs under the Hong Kong 97 percent decision, we
have used the same political economy approach as for sensitive and
special products, but have applied it only to imports from LDCs.
For the United States, 84 of 95 exempted products are in the
wearing apparel categories, and sugar is also exempted. For Japan,
rice is exempted, as are numerous fishery products, processed 
food, and wearing and footwear products. The European Union
does not exempt products because of its Everything But Arms
(EBA) initiative.
The Doha agreement will also include bindings on levels of
domestic support and export subsidies. In our basic scenario,
export subsidies are eliminated in 2013 as decided in Hong Kong
in December 2005. However, applied levels of trade-distorting
domestic support are not assumed to be reduced by the agreement 
on subsidy limits. LDCs do not reduce their agricultural or manu-
facturing tariffs, and liberalization of services trade is not modeled.
Impact of the Basic Scenario on Protection 
and Market Access
Our model includes 39 countries or aggregated regions, of which 
6 are developed countries/regions, 24 are MICs, and 9 are low-
income (consisting of LDCs and two regions, Developing Asia and
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, that include a mix of LDCs and
MICs). Eighteen sectors are modeled, of which 10 are agricultural.6
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Box 1  Overview of the Basic Scenario
Tariffs
￿ Tariff formula for agriculture: G20 thresholds with EU
reduction coefficients
￿ Reduction coefficients: one-third less for MICs
￿ Ad valorem equivalent of specific tariffs: calculated on the
basis of the 2005 World Trade Organization (WTO)
formula
￿ Tariff caps in agriculture: developed countries, 150 percent;
MICs, 300 percent
￿ Five percent of agricultural tariff lines exempted as sensitive
and special products
￿ Sensitive and special products: 50 percent less tariff
reduction and no caps, but tariff-rate quotas (TRQs)
increased according to the European formula
￿ Swiss formula cuts for manufacturing tariffs: developed-
country coefficient, 10 percent; MIC coefficient, 25 percent
￿ LDCs do not cut their own agricultural or manufacturing
tariffs
￿ Liberalization in services not included 
￿ Free access for LDCs to OECD markets in 2008, with 
3 percent of tariff lines exempted
￿ Tariff reform implemented in 5 years for developed
countries, 10 years for MICs
Domestic Support
￿ Applied domestic support levels are not cut
Export Subsidies 
￿ Eliminated in 2013
3A full description of MacMap is available at the CEPII web site.
4 This formula was negotiated to resolve differences in views regarding what prices would be utilized to assess the ad valorem (percentage) equivalent
of the specific tariffs.
5 The formula was proposed by S. Jean, D. Laborde, and W. Martin in Trade Reform and the Doha Agenda (K. Anderson and W. Martin, editors),
World Bank, 2005.
6 The modeling utilizes the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 6.1 database, which provides benchmark information for 2001. Before running the
basic scenario, liberalization occurring from 2001 to 2006 was taken into account: end of the Uruguay Round, Chinese accession to the WTO,
enlargement of the EU, implementation of the African Growth Opportunities Act (AGOA) and the EBA initiative. Full description of the GTAP is
available at the GTAP (www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu) web site. The specification of the MIRAGE model utilized in this analysis is similar to but
differs in a few specifics from the one described generally in the earlier brief; additional details are available on request.The impacts of the basic scenario on protection and market
access are shown in Table 1. The two first columns indicate the
average tariff applied by each country or region in 2005 and 2015,
followed by the reduction of the tariff levels and the rates of
reduction. The next four columns provide this information about
the average tariff faced by each country/region’s exports.
The basic trade reform does not modify the degree of protec-
tion for a number of developing countries for several reasons: for
example, for Chile, due to the binding overhang phenomenon
(tariffs bound well above the applied levels), or for countries
receiving special and differentiated treatment (LDCs do not lower
their tariffs), or because the country does not have any commit-
ment (Vietnam is not a WTO member). The numerical reduction
of tariffs is higher for MICs than for developed countries, but the
reductions are proportionally higher for developed countries, except
for India, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, and Nigeria. The Developing
Asia and the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa regions show reduced
tariffs on imports because of the MICs within these regions.
Gains in market access, measured by the rate of reduction on
average tariffs faced by exports, are particularly high for Malawi, are
significant for Zimbabwe, Rest of Developing Asia, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Uruguay, Brazil, Turkey, Vietnam, Thailand, and Rest of
Latin America, and are close to zero in the case of Nigeria, Mexico,
Venezuela, and Rest of Middle East and North Africa. The gains
are larger, but remain comparatively small for Malaysia, Peru, the
Philippines, and the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, the
reform as measured by rates of tariff reduction benefits MICs and
low-income countries in terms of market access. MICs lower their
own tariffs an average of 19.1 percent, but tariffs on their exports
fall by 25.3 percent. The tariffs of low-income countries/regions fall
by an average of 10.3 percent, while tariffs on their exports fall by
32.5 percent.
Table 2 illustrates tariff reductions from a sectoral perspective.
World protection across the agricultural and manufacturing sectors
declines from an average of 5.6 percent to 4.3 percent. The decrease
is one-fourth of the decline (to zero protection) that would occur
with full liberalization. But agricultural protection is cut by only 
18.7 percent while industrial tariffs decline by 26.3 percent. The
lesser rate of reduction of agricultural tariffs is due to the relatively
unambitious agricultural tariff formula in the basic scenario and to
exemptions allowed to the formula. The rates of tariff reduction for
all agricultural products except live animals are less than the average
rate of reduction for industry. Sugar and rice are initially the most
protected products, but avoid a very large cut in protection.
Impact of the Basic Scenario on Real Income
The basic scenario produces a world income gain of $54.7 billion by
2020. This represents a 0.13 percent augmentation of real world
income, which is about one-quarter of the gains estimated from full
trade liberalization.7 The distribution of gains is somewhat progres-
sive but is largely proportional to initial shares of world income, as
shown in the top rows of Table 3. Developed countries initially
account for 80.0 percent of world income and obtain 58.5 percent of
the gains. The most progressive result is for MICs: they account for
18.7 percent of initial income but obtain 39.6 percent of the gain.
Low-income countries obtain a paltry gain of just $1.03 billion.
Among LDCs, the trade reform proves very positive only for
Malawi, but is slightly negative for the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa,
Mozambique, Madagascar, and Zambia (separate country results
are not shown in the tables). Limited LDC gains are not surprising
because LDCs do not reform their own trade policies, the basic
scenario modeled is not very ambitious, and free access to the
OECD markets is restricted. For MICs, the basic trade reform is
systematically positive except for Venezuela, Mexico, and the Rest
of the World (due to a deterioration of their terms of trade).
Argentina and Brazil gain 0.17 percent and 0.13 percent of their
real incomes, or $0.7 billion and $0.9 billion, respectively. Larger
gains are attained by China (0.25 percent of income, $6.0 billion)
and India (0.3 percent of income, $2.8 billion). Gains are also
substantial for Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Turkey.
Free LDC Access: 
From 97 Percent to 100 Percent
To consider a more development-oriented outcome, we evaluate an
extension of the free access of LDCs to OECD markets, while
retaining all other assumptions of the basic scenario. With full free
access, LDCs are granted a substantial preference in OECD
markets relative to the limited ambition of the multilateral tariff
reductions, especially for agriculture. Conversely, without full free
access, LDCs face some erosion of their existing preferences and
greater competition as exporters due to the limited multilateral
tariff cuts.
The effect on LDCs of extending their free access to OECD
markets from 97 percent to 100 percent is quite dramatic, as
shown in the middle rows of Table 3. World welfare gains increase
by 26 percent compared to the basic scenario, from $54.7 billion
to $69.0 billion in 2020. Of the additional income gains, nearly 
50 percent goes to LDCs. Their total gain jumps to $7.0 billion,
and all of the low-income countries/regions benefit, compared to
only five in the basic scenario. The LDC gains come from
improved terms of trade and expanded export volumes. The
increased volume of exports is shown in Table 4. Three examples
illustrate the benefits:
￿ For Bangladesh, real income increases by $1.2 billion more than
in the basic scenario, a 1.6 percent increase instead of a low 
0.2 percent. Textiles and apparel represent about 70 percent of
initial Bangladesh exports. Textiles exports to the United States
increase by 55.8 percent instead of 34.8 percent, while apparel
exports increase by 31.6 percent instead of 15.4 percent.
￿ For Developing Asia, real income increases by $3.1 billion
more than in the basic scenario, a 1.4 percent increase instead
of 0.3 percent. Exports of rice to Developed Asia expand by a
multiple of 674 (from a low initial base) with full free access
instead of fourfold in the basic scenario.
3
7 This is a level similar to the unambitious scenario modeled in our earlier analysis.Table 1 Impact of the Basic Scenario on Applied Protection and Market Access
High-income countries
Australia/New Zealand 4.7 2.8 –1.9 –40.2 10.2 7.8 –2.4 –23.7
Canada 3.4 2.3 –1.1 –31.6 4.1 2.8 –1.3 –31.6
Developed Asia 4.3 3.6 –0.7 –16.6 5.9 4.5 –1.5 –24.6
European Union 3.3 2.0 –1.2 –37.4 6.2 4.8 –1.4 –22.5
Rest of OECD 4.8 3.5 –1.3 –27.0 2.6 2.0 –0.6 –23.0
United States 2.3 1.4 –0.9 –40.4 5.7 4.5 –1.2 –21.8
3.3 2.3 –1.0 –31.0 5.8 4.4 –1.4 –23.5
Middle-income countries
Argentina 12.6 10.8 –1.8 –14.0 13.5 11.6 –1.9 –13.8
Brazil 11.8 9.9 –1.9 –15.9 11.1 8.7 –2.4 –21.5
Chile 6.9 6.9 0.0 0.0 5.3 4.3 –1.0 –19.1
China 14.1 13.9 –0.2 –1.2 5.7 3.6 –2.2 –37.8
India 33.5 18.3 –15.2 –45.3 7.4 5.5 –1.9 –25.3
Indonesia 5.7 4.8 –0.9 –15.5 5.8 4.4 –1.4 –24.3
Latin America 8.2 7.5 –0.7 –8.5 9.8 7.7 –2.1 –21.6
Malaysia 11.9 5.7 –6.2 –52.2 3.9 3.2 –0.7 –18.0
Mexico 11.0 8.8 –2.3 –20.7 2.4 1.9 –0.4 –18.3
Morocco 20.8 12.2 –8.6 –41.3 5.2 3.4 –1.8 –34.5
Nigeria 25.8 17.8 –8.0 –30.9 2.5 2.4 –0.1 –5.4
Pakistan 18.3 13.4 –4.9 –27.0 8.1 5.7 –2.4 –29.3
Peru 12.7 12.4 –0.4 –3.1 4.2 3.3 –0.9 –22.0
Philippines 4.8 4.4 –0.4 –7.7 2.9 2.1 –0.7 –24.9
Rest of Middle/East and
North Africa 9.2 7.5 –1.7 –18.3 2.4 2.0 –0.4 –16.8
Rest of the world 9.7 9.3 –0.4 –4.4 4.8 3.8 –1.0 –20.1
South African Customs
Union 8.3 6.0 –2.4 –28.3 6.5 4.9 –1.6 –24.9
Thailand 12.6 8.2 –4.4 –34.9 8.2 6.2 –2.0 –23.9
Tunisia 20.1 13.3 –6.9 –34.1 5.6 3.7 –1.9 –33.7
Turkey 6.0 5.2 –0.8 –14.0 7.1 4.9 –2.3 –31.9
Uruguay 10.7 9.0 –1.7 –15.5 16.0 13.6 –2.4 –15.2
Venezuela 11.2 9.9 –1.3 –11.4 2.6 2.3 –0.3 –10.0
Vietnam 14.4 14.4 0.0 0.0 7.1 4.8 –2.3 –32.5
Zimbabwe 15.8 11.7 –4.1 –26.1 14.2 11.1 –3.1 –21.9
12.0 9.7 –2.3 –19.1 5.2 3.9 –1.3 –25.3
Low-income countries
Bangladesh 16.9 16.9 0.0 0.0 5.0 2.4 –2.6 –52.8
Developing Asia 9.1 8.3 –0.9 –9.4 7.8 4.7 –3.0 –38.9
Madagascar 4.4 4.4 0.0 0.0 3.1 1.7 –1.4 –45.0
Malawi 11.4 11.4 0.0 0.0 19.8 11.4 –8.5 –42.7
Mozambique 9.9 9.9 0.0 0.0 5.4 3.5 –1.9 –35.0
Rest of Sub-Saharan
Africa 14.5 12.3 –2.2 –15.3 4.3 3.4 –0.9 –21.1
Tanzania 14.2 14.2 0.0 0.0 8.3 6.3 –2.0 –24.5
Uganda 8.1 8.1 0.0 0.0 7.1 5.4 –1.7 –24.2
Zambia 11.8 11.8 0.0 0.0 4.9 3.0 –1.9 –38.5
12.9 11.6 –1.3 –10.3 5.6 3.8 –1.8 –32.5
Source: MacMap-HS6 and authors’ calculations.
Tariffs Applied on Imports Tariffs Faced by Exports
Rate of Rate of
Country/Region 2005 2015 Reduction Reduction 2005 2015 Reduction Reduction
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
4￿ For Malawi, real income increases by $0.1 billion more than in
the basic scenario, a 6.7 percent increase instead of 2.7 percent.
This is caused primarily by expanded exports of Other Agri-
cultural Products toward OECD markets.
For Developed Asia, the impact of full free LDC access on
domestic rice production in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is
substantial. Production falls by 32.3 percent compared to a decline
of just 3.9 percent if exemptions are allowed. For two other
sensitive sectors, textiles and apparel in the United States, the
impact is much smaller. U.S. production of apparel declines by
8.74 percent with full free access compared to 8.72 percent with
exemptions. Similarly, for the textile industry, the decrease is 
6.07 percent instead of 6.06 percent.
Fewer Sensitive and Special Products: 
From 5 Percent Exemption to 1 Percent
As an alternative to providing 100 percent OECD free market
access to LDCs, we model a reduction of the number of sensitive
and special products from 5 percent of agricultural tariff lines 
to 1 percent, while retaining the other assumptions of the basic
scenario (including 97 percent free LDC access). This multilateral
strengthening of the trade reform leads to a world income gain 
of $62.0 billion, an increase of $7.3 billion compared to the 
basic scenario. As shown in the bottom rows of Table 3, the 
additional income gains are broadly distributed, with the largest
gains going to the developed countries because they have made 
additional reforms to their own policies. Australia/New Zealand
benefits from terms-of-trade gains due to better access to foreign
agricultural markets. Developed Asia and Rest of OECD experi-
ence increased allocation efficiency gains. Global gains are
constrained by the retention of 1 percent of highly protected
products as sensitive or special.8
Seven MICs also benefit from additional income gains:
Thailand, Vietnam, Uruguay, Morocco, Tunisia, the South African
Customs Union (SACU), and Zimbabwe. Restricting the number
of special and sensitive products has a positive impact on the
exports of these seven countries: rice in the case of Thailand,
Vietnam, and Uruguay; vegetable and fruit for Morocco and
5
Table 2  Impact of the Basic Scenario on Average World Tariffs by Sector
2005 2015 Reduction Rate of
Tariff Rate Tariff Rate 2005–2015  Reduction
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
World 5.6 4.3 –1.4 –24.1
Agri-food 18.2 14.8 –3.4 –18.7
Animal products and wool 6.3 4.7 –1.6 –25.9
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 17.3 10.1 –7.2 –41.8
Plant-based fibers 2.3 2.2 –0.1 –2.5
Sugar 52.4 42.6 –9.8 –18.7
Vegetables and fruits 14.8 12.3 –2.5 –17.0
Wheat 16.1 15.3 –0.8 –5.2
Other agricultural products 17.0 14.4 –2.7 –15.6
Raw milk and dairy products 35.7 28.9 –6.8 –19.2
Paddy and processed rice 68.5 56.3 –12.2 –17.8
Other food products 16.1 12.9 –3.2 –19.9
Primary products (including forestry and fishing) 1.4 1.2 –0.2 –16.3
Industry 4.9 3.6 –1.3 –26.3
Wearing apparel and leather products 10.6 5.5 –5.1 –47.9
Textiles 10.6 7.0 –3.6 –34.3
Chemical, mineral, and metal products 4.8 3.7 –1.1 –22.8
Vehicle equipment 4.2 3.3 –0.9 –21.6
Other manufactured products 3.3 2.5 –0.9 –26.3
Source: MacMap-HS6 and authors’ calculations.
8 Eliminating all exemptions for special and sensitive products results in a global income gain of $95.1 billion (a gain of $40.4 billion compared to the
basic scenario), with $2.7 billion going to low-income countries. This reform goes beyond proposals currently under consideration in the Doha Round.
The model results are available on request.Tunisia; other food products for all of these
countries except Morocco; milk for Uruguay; and
wheat for the SACU.
Conclusion
The model results presented in this brief demon-
strate that there are modest market access and
global income gains from a plausible but not
very ambitious Doha basic scenario. MICs
benefit from a relatively greater rate of reduction
of tariffs faced by their exports compared to
tariff cuts on their imports. The MICs achieve
income gains that are more than proportional to
their initial share of world income. LDCs also
benefit from reductions to the tariffs on their
exports, but receive only $1.03 billion of income
gain in the basic scenario.
Two development-oriented alternatives
demonstrate that more can be accomplished in
the Doha Round if there is the political will. First,
granting LDCs 100 percent free access to OECD
markets specifically targets the poorest countries,
addresses both agricultural and manufacturing
trade, and brings tariffs to zero for these countries
and products. This reform dramatically increases
LDC income gains as their terms of trade improve
and exports expand. This reform has been pro-
posed by the EU.
Second, limiting the number of sensitive and
special products to 1 percent of agricultural tariff
lines provides broad-based gains compared to the
basic scenario. This reform has the advantage of
being a multilateral step toward lower trade
barriers. The gains from this reform are wide-
spread but are limited because only agricultural
products are affected, tariffs fall just to the rela-
tively unambitious levels of the basic scenario, and
a number of products remain highly protected
under the remaining 1 percent exemptions. This
reform has been proposed by the United States.
Developed countries could provide strategic
leadership in bringing the Doha Round to closure
by offering these two development-oriented and
pro-trade measures.
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Initial share in real world income (%) 80.0 18.7 1.2
Basic scenario
Real income gain (billion US$) 31.98 21.66 1.03
Share of real income gain (%) 58.5 39.6 1.9
Free LDC access to OECD
Real income gain (billion US$) 38.92 23.08 7.01
Share of real income gain (%) 56.4 33.4 10.2
Fewer sensitive/special products
Real income gain (billion US$) 38.28 22.57 1.11
Share of real income gain (%) 61.8 36.4 1.8
Source: Authors’ calculations.















Source: MacMap-HS6 and authors’ calculations.
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